Dollarization, liquidity and performance: Evidence from Turkish banking by Caglayan, Mustafa & Talavera, Oleksandr
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Dollarization, liquidity and performance:
Evidence from Turkish banking
Mustafa Caglayan and Oleksandr Talavera
Heriot-Watt University, University of Sheffield
16 July 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72812/
MPRA Paper No. 72812, posted 2 August 2016 08:26 UTC
Dollarization, liquidity and performance: Evidence from
Turkish bankingI
Mustafa Caglayana, Oleksandr Talaverab
aSchool of Management and Languages,Heriot–Watt University, Edinburgh EH14 4AS, UK
bManagement School, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK
Abstract
Using a panel of Turkish commercial banks, we examine credit dollarization and its impact
on banks’ liquidity and profitability. Our estimates suggest that banks partially pass-
through foreign denominated funds to borrowers in the form of foreign denominated credit.
Furthermore, banks which lend in foreign denominated currency hold less liquid assets and
experience higher return on assets. The results suggest that, when the domestic currency is
stable, banks in Turkey manage their liquidity aggressively to earn higher returns on foreign
denominated funds.
JEL Classification Numbers: G20, G21
Key words: Financial Dollarization, Commercial Banks, Liquidity, Performance,
Pass-through
ICorresponding author: Mustafa Caglayan, School of Management & Languages; Accountancy,
Economics and Finance, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh, EH14 4AS, United Kingdom. Phone:
+44 (0)131 451 8373, Email: m.caglayan@hw.ac.uk.
IIThanks: The authors are grateful to Pınar O¨zlu¨ for her specific comments, as well as those of
participants in the 2016 International Finance and Banking Society Conference, Barcelona. Standard
disclaimer applies.
Email addresses: m.caglayan@hw.ac.uk (Mustafa Caglayan), o.talavera@shef.ac.uk
(Oleksandr Talavera)
July 16, 2016
Dollarization, liquidity and performance: Evidence from Turkish banking
Abstract
Using a panel of Turkish commercial banks, we examine credit dollarization and its impact
on banks’ liquidity and profitability. Our estimates suggest that banks partially pass-
through foreign denominated funds to borrowers in the form of foreign denominated credit.
Furthermore, banks which lend in foreign denominated currency hold less liquid assets and
experience higher return on assets. The results suggest that, when the domestic currency is
stable, banks in Turkey manage their liquidity aggressively to earn higher returns on foreign
denominated funds.
Keywords: Financial Dollarization, Commercial Banks, Liquidity, Performance,
Pass-through
JEL classification: G20, G21.
2
1. Introduction
An examination of banks’ balance sheets shows that financial dollarization has
gained a permanent role in emerging and transition economies.1 This phenomena
attracted the interest of researchers and policymakers alike, for dollarization can
trigger balance of payments and financial crises following a rapid depreciation of
the domestic currency against the hard currencies. In such circumstances, as the
foreign investors pull out of the country and the crisis sets in, the IMF or the World
Bank designs a rescue package that promises an injection of substantial amounts of
funds into the stricken country on the condition that certain structural reforms are
implemented.
To explain the factors behind financial dollarization, researchers have developed
several analytical models, which subsequently guided the empirical research to date.
For instance, realizing that in periods of high inflation and macroeconomic turbulence
households and firms use foreign currency for transaction as well as storage purposes,
researchers have proposed the monetary substitution view and the asset portfolio
view. The monetary substitution view suggests that as the country experiences a
period of high inflation and/or macroeconomic turbulence, economic agents use a hard
foreign currency to overcome the purchasing power risk. Whereas the asset portfolio
view rationalizes how much domestic versus foreign assets one should carry in a risky
portfolio. In particular, the theory suggests that a risk-averse household must consider
the variance between the two types of assets along with the expected real interest rate
differential between foreign and local deposits to construct her portfolio.2 Researchers
have also suggested that weak institutions would lead to dollarization if the economic
agents within and outside the country are not certain about the credibility of the
policies and contract enforcement in the country.3 Lastly, it has been argued that
1We use the term financial dollarization to describe the denomination of bank deposits and loans
in a foreign currency rather than the domestic currency of the country in which they are held.
2See, among others, Uribe (1997), Engineer (2000), and Winkelried and Castillo (2010) on mon-
etary substitution view, and Calvo (2002), Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) and Luca and Petrova (2008)
on portfolio allocation models.
3See for instance Burnside et al. (2000), De Nicolo´ et al. (2003), Levy-Yeyati (2006).
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market failure may lead to dollarization.4
When we examine the empirical literature, we find that the proposed theories on
financial dollarization have been tested using annual aggregate panel datasets con-
structed for emerging economies. Surprisingly, to our knowledge, researchers have not
focused on one country at a time to examine the impact of financial dollarization on
domestic banks. Lack of research along these lines creates a gap in our understanding
because those very domestic banks, which accept foreign currency denominated de-
posits or raise dollar denominated funds, not only act as an intermediary channeling
funds from savers to spenders, but also affect the health of the financial system as
they shift risks which may emerge from sudden changes in the value of the domestic
currency. Hence, it is important to examine financial dollarization from the perspec-
tive of commercial banks which operate in a single country so that we understand the
consequences of dollarization.
In this study, different from the rest of the literature, we focus on a panel of
commercial banks collected from Turkey to examine credit dollarization and its con-
sequences on banks’ liquidity and profitability. In doing so, we also examine to what
extent macroeconomic factors affect banks’ dollar denominated loans, liquidity and
performance. Given that the country experienced a highly inflationary period, which
started as of the mid 1980s and ended with the implementation of a structural re-
form package following the 2001 financial crises, financial dollarization has been a
major issue in Turkey for quite a long time, reaching 56% in 2001. During these two
decades, many businesses, banks and finance houses declared bankruptcy or went into
administration for they could not pay back their debt as the value of the domestic
currency depreciated on a daily basis.5 Following the 2001 stabilization programme,
rate of inflation dropped to less than 10% per annum by 2003 and stayed around the
6-9% level.
Such an examination for Turkish banks is meaningful as the country continued
to experience high levels of dollarization even after the implementation of the 2001
structural reforms to date. However, the structural stalled with the establishment
4See for instance Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2006) and De La Torre and Schmukler (2004).
5See Baum et al. (2010) and the references therein.
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of the right wing government, which singlehandedly ruled the country following the
2002 election. In general, high levels of dollarization in a relatively stable economy
is not unexpected for it reflects the continuing public distrust on the government’s
economic policies. Yet, this observation for Turkey is surprising because despite
the rhetoric of the governing party that the economy was in safe hands, apparently,
savers and borrowers did not trust the actions of the government and continued to use
foreign denominated assets (currency) for major transactions and portfolio allocation
purposes.6
Figure 1 displays the extent of financial dollarization in Turkey since 2003. We
see that loan dollarization was well above 50% in the beginning of 2003, yet over
the next 5 years it declined to 25% by 2008. Then after, loan dollarization began to
increase reaching at approximately 35% by the end of the sample period. Deposit
and liability dollarization portray a worse tendency. Both ratios were around 70%
in the beginning of the sample, yet we observe a slow downward trend. At the end
of 2014, deposit dollarization reached around the 50% mark and foreign liability to
total liability ratio was close to the 60% mark. The figure, in fact, suggest that the
overall health of the economy is dependent on the resilience of the banking sector in
Turkey to shocks. If the health of the banking sector were to deteriorate due to an
adverse shock, the Turkish economy, which is suffering from chronic current account
deficit and high levels of debt, could experience a recession deeper than that in 2001.
We start our empirical investigation by examining whether the availability of for-
eign denominated funds lead to credit dollarization. To investigate this issue we
estimate a model which captures foreign denominated asset pass-through to borrow-
ers. We next explore how dollarization affects liquid assets and bank performance. In
doing so, we particularly focus on the role of foreign denominated funds and credit on
liquidity and banks’ performance measures. In our examination, we also scrutinize the
role of macroeconomic factors such as exchange rate volatility and the interest rate
differential between foreign and domestic currency denominated loans and deposits.
This is relevant because until around 2011 the government carried out a widespread
privatization programme to attract foreign investors’ attention to bring their funds
6According to Vieira et al. (2012), dollarization is a response to the future inflation expectations.
Hence, low inflation does not necessarily promote de-dollarization.
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to Turkey while the central bank tried to achieve an inflation rate below double digit
figures with a target around 5-6%. These goals required the Turkish central bank to
keep a close eye on the value and the volatility of the exchange rate.7
Our investigation covers the period between 2003q1 to 2014q1. All bank level data
are collected from the Banks Association of Turkey website. We estimate our empiri-
cal models using the generalized linear model (GLM) and instrumental variables fixed
effect methodologies. Our examination provides evidence that foreign denominated
funds available to the banks are partially passed onto the borrowers in the form of
foreign denominated credit. This implies that banks do take advantage of the stabil-
ity of the domestic currency as they raised funds cheaply from international money
markets to extend credit in foreign or domestic currency. In an environment where
the value of the exchange rate is stable this strategy is sensible for banks can manage
their liquid assets more aggressively to boost their return. Our investigation further
shows that banks that lend in foreign denominated currency experience a significant
reduction in performance in response to exchange rate fluctuations. We also find that
bank returns decline when the interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign
denominated funds (or loans) widens. These results, despite banks fully hedge against
fluctuations in the exchange rate, signal that the Turkish banking sector would face
significant difficulties in the future as political and financial unrest begin to emerge
due to unsustainable policies of the government.8 Lastly, we should note that our
results are similar across the estimation methodologies that we implement, providing
support for the robustness of our findings. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents our empirical models and the data. Section 3 discusses
the results and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Empirical Model
As a result of high and chronic inflation experienced in the late 70s and the lib-
eralization of the foreign exchange regime in 1984, foreign exchange deposits became
7The policymakers did their utmost to keep the currency stable so that growth could be achieved
through cheap imported consumption and investment goods. The downside of this policy was a
soaring current account deficit.
8See, for example, de Nicolo´ et al. (2005) who discuss the fragility of dollarized financial systems.
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an important financial saving instrument in Turkey by the mid 1980s. This devel-
opment increased the availability of funds to corporations which needed large sums
for their fixed capital investment projects. However, high inflation and cut-throat
competition in the financial markets, which continued throughout the turbulent 80s
and 90s, have led to bankruptcy of many brokerage firms as well as established family
firms, and paved way to emergence of several new corporations which were able to
adapt to the new economic conditions. With the implementation of the structural
changes following the 2001 crises, the rate of inflation declined to single digit figures
and stabilized around the 6-9% band. Following the 2001 crises, the banking sector
had to be restructured but there was no secular changes with respect to the extent
of dollarization.
In what follows below, we examine financial dollarization in Turkey for the post
2003-period during which the rate of inflation was in single digits and the exchange
rate was stable. However, dollarization which mainly emerged after 1984, continued to
be an important source of concern. In particular, we empirically investigate financial
dollarization from three facets. We initially examine to what extent foreign denomi-
nated liabilities are passed onto borrowers in the form of credit. We then investigate
whether dollarization affects management of liquid assets. Lastly, we examine the
role of dollarization on bank performance. It is useful to note that all variables are
measured in US dollars because banks in Turkey mainly use the US Dollar to extend
loans to borrowers, while lending in other hard currencies such as Euros or Japanese
Yens is less but not uncommon.
Pass-through
To examine foreign liability pass-through in the banking sector, we use the following
form:
DollarizationLit = α + β1Dollarization
D,T
it + β2Ct (1)
+β3Dollarization
D,T




+ µt + νi + it
The dependent variableDollarizationL, which captures credit dollarization, is defined
as the ratio of loans denominated in foreign currency to total credits. In this model
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we are specifically interested in the coefficient associated with DollarizationD,T ,
which measures either the total foreign denominated liabilities (deposits and borrowed
funds) to total liabilities (deposits and borrowed funds) ratio (DollarizationT ) or the
total foreign currency denominated deposits to total deposits ratio (DollarizationD).
Any estimate of β1 that is less than unity would suggest that the banks do not fully
pass foreign currency funds to borrowers. In this context, a low pass-through implies
that foreign denominated funds which banks do not lend out in foreign currency are
converted into domestic currency and extended as credit in domestic currency to other
borrowers. This strategy, although risky, is meaningful when the value of the Turk-
ish Lira was relatively stable and it was cheap to raise funds from the international
money markets.
Pass-through also might depend on other factors. In particular, we introduce two
macroeconomic control (C) variables which have been shown to be important in cross
country data. One of the control variables evaluates the role of risks that may emanate
from exchange rate fluctuations. To measure exchange rate volatility, we compute
the within year standard deviation or the inter quartile range of the exchange rate
between Turkish Lira against the US Dollar (CSD or CIQR). We also employ loan
interest rate differential (CCR) or liabilities interest rate differential (CDR) to gauge
the effect of cost or revenue margins between domestic and foreign currencies loans.
We expect the coefficient associated with the changes in interest margins will take a
negative sign as this will induce banks to exercise a higher pass-through of foreign
denominated funds to borrowers. However, the coefficient associated with exchange
rate volatility may not be significant because Turkish banks fully hedge against their
foreign exchange rate positions.
Equation 1 also contains an interaction term between the control variables and
measures of dollarization. We expect that the sign of the coefficient of the interaction
term between the control variable and the foreign currency liability ratio, β3, would be
positive but not necessarily significant, due to hedging. Such an observation implies
that as risks and the cost of raising external funds increase, the total pass-through
should increase to reduce financial risks that banks assume. Lastly, we should in-
dicate that our model incorporates bank level control variables including bank size
(Log(TA)), bank strength (Equity/TA). Bank specific fixed effects are depicted by
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νi, time effects are captured by µt, and the error term is denoted by it.
Liquidity Management
In an environment with no market imperfections, banks can raise funds from the
money markets when demand exceeds the available funds. Furthermore, banks that
have opportunities would not hold cash more than the amount required by the central
bank, as liquid assets yield no or little return. From the perspective of the Turkish
banks, given that the period under investigation was relatively stable, and that banks
could find funds from international money markets at low rates, one would expect
that banks which raise foreign denominated funds would manage their liquidity more
aggressively to earn higher profits. To scrutinize whether this hypothesis holds, we
examine the data using the following empirical model:
Liquidityit = α + β1Dollarization
L
it + β2Ct +
β3Dollarization
L
it × Ct + β4DollarizationD,Tit + (2)
β5Dollarization
D,T
it × Ct + β6Log(TA)it + µt + νi + it
Given the model above, we are mainly interested in the sign of the coefficient as-
sociated with DollarizationL, which measures the ratio of credit given to borrowers
in foreign currency. We expect that the higher this ratio, the more aggressive the
liquidity management will be. Hence, β1 will take a negative sign. Similar to Equa-
tion 1, this model incorporates several control variables. In particular, the model
controls for exchange rate variability and interest rate differentials between loans and
deposits. We also incorporate several interaction terms. These interaction terms are
between the two control variables and i) foreign denominated loans to assets ratio; ii)
total foreign funds to total assets, (DollarizationT ); and iii) total foreign currency
deposits to total assets ratio, (DollarizationD). Besides, we have bank level variables
that measures bank size (total assets) and bank strength (equity to total assets ratio).
Lastly, the model includes time and bank level fixed effects, νi and µt. The error term
is denoted by it.
Performance
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Finally, we examine the effect of dollarization on bank performance. We expect that
banks which lend foreign denominated funds would strive to achieve higher returns
in assets. In particular, we examine the following model:
Performanceit = α + β1Dollarization
L
it + β2Ct +
β3Dollarization
L
it × Ct + β4DollarizationD,Tit + (3)
β5Dollarization
D,T
it × Ct + β6Log(TA) + µt + νi + it
where performance is measured by banks’ return on equity or net interest margin. In
this model we expect that β1 will take a positive sign indicating that the ratio of loans
denominated in foreign currency to total assets leads banks to higher performance. We
measure sources of dollarization by i) total foreign denominated liabilities (deposits
and funds) to total liabilities, (DollarizationT ); and ii) total foreign currency deposits
to total deposits ratio, (DollarizationD). Although one would expect that the foreign
denominated liabilities would have a negative impact on banks’ performance due to
embedded risks in running the operations based on the availability of funds from the
international money markets, it should not be too surprising to observe no significant
effect for banks fully hedge against exchange rate risks. As in the previous two models,
we control for macroeconomic factors, risks associated with exchange rate fluctuations
and interest rate differentials. We expect that both exchange rate variability and
interest rate differentials will have a negative impact on performance as these variables
capture increase in costs associated with raising funds from external sources. However,
if exchange rate risks are fully hedged, then it is highly likely that we will not observe
significance on variables that gauge exchange rate risk.
Similar to the previous two models, equation 3 contains several interaction terms
which allow us to examine whether the effects of dollarization on bank performance
relate to changes in control variables. In general these interaction terms are likely to
take a negative sign as they capture how dollarization will affect performance as risks
increase. The risks will lead to an overall reduction in bank profitability as banks will
spend resources to overcome any difficulties that may arise due to fluctuations in the
value of the currency. The model also contains bank size (Log(TA)), macro control
variable (C), bank strength (Equity/TA) bank specific fixed effects, captured by νi,
year and quarter effects, captured by µt. The error term is denoted by it.
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2.1. Methodological Issues
There are a number of methodological issues that could arise due to the nature of
our dependent variable and potential endogeneity issues. Especially it is important
to use the proper estimation approach in modeling a variable which is bounded.
In our case, the ratio of foreign currency denominated credit to total assets ratio
(Loan$/TA) is constrained within zero and one. To address this problem, we employ
the Generalized Linear Model (GLM) estimator. Another potential problem is linked
to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, which could be caused by simultaneity
among key bank-level variables. The solution to this problem is not obvious, but
we attempt to minimize the severeness of the endogeneity problem by lagging all our
bank-level variables in our GLM estimations or by employing panel data instrumental
variable approach. Our instrument set includes second and third lags of all bank-
level independent variables. The validity of instruments is confirmed by Sargan-
type test of overidentifying restrictions. Furthermore, to check for weakness of our
instruments we calculate the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, which is also known as
the underidentification test.
2.1.1. Data
Our dataset contains detailed information on all banks’ balance sheets as pub-
lished on the Banks Association of Turkey website.9 The original data set has 2,075
quarterly observations from which we excluded banks that have gone into administra-
tion. We also removed investment or development banks from our data. To alleviate
the influence of extreme observations, bank-level variables are winsorized at the most
extreme (top and bottom) one percent level of the distribution.10 After the screening,
our sample consists of 1,614 bank-quarter observations pertaining to 46 banks. The
data cover the period between 2003q1 to 2014q1.
9As of January 2015, available at http://www.tbb.org.tr/en/banks-and-banking-sector-
information/statistical-reports/20
10We have also experimented with winsorizing 2% and 3% of distribution of all our bank-level
variables and we received quantitatively similar results.
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Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables. We observe that ap-
proximately 33% of loans extended by banks in Turkey are denominated in foreign
currency. Given that the associated standard deviation is 25%, it is clear that while
some banks extend quite a lot credit in foreign currency than the average, others
lend much less. Furthermore, on average 50% of all deposits are denominated in
foreign currency. Similar to the case of loans the standard deviation is high (24%).
Examining the quartiles, we see that for a quarter of the cases deposits in foreign
denominated currency is well above sixty percent of the total assets for some banks.
Lastly, 58% of the liabilities of banks in Turkey are denominated in a foreign currency.
These averages which provide a glimpse of the extent of dollarization in Turkey are
substantial. It appears that although the inflation rate has fallen following the imple-
mentation of structural reforms that were put into place after the financial meltdown
in 2001, public has not developed much trust for the economic policies of the conser-
vative government which singlehandedly ruled the country since 2002. Statistics on
liquidity are also unusual. We surmise that banks carry high liquidity to overcome
any shock that the government polices might inflict on the economy. The statistics
on liquidity also suggest that there is room to manage bank liquidity better as liquid
assets earn little or no interest. Nevertheless, the reason to hold high levels of liquid
assets may be to have the ability to fend off sudden runs to the banks.
Examining bank performance, we find that quarterly return on equity is about
3%, which yields an annual return of about 12%. Quarterly net interest margin,
which measures the difference between the interest income generated and the interest
expense, is around 1%. Overall, the statistics on bank performance show that banking
sector is very profitable, and explain to some degree why the foreign banks strive to
enter into the banking sector in Turkey.11
Over the period of investigation, regardless of the method used, average exchange
rate volatility has been reasonably low, inducing banks to raise foreign denominated
funds from the international money markets. The average difference between domes-
tic and foreign denominated loan and deposit rates is in the order of 13% with a
standard deviation of 9% suggesting a decline over the years as the rate of inflation
11The number of foreign owned banks in Turkey has grown considerably over the last two decades.
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fell. However, compared to developed economies the real interest paid to funds is
quite high and explains the reason why Turkey was able to attract foreign direct
investment since the beginning of the millennium.
3. Empirical Results
We first explore to what extent foreign denominated funds are passed onto bor-
rowers in the form of credit. Subsequently, we examine the link between dollarization
and liquidity management. Finally, we turn to investigate the impact of dollariza-
tion on bank performance. Pass-through effects are estimated by implementing both
GLM and instrumental variables fixed effects (IV-FE) methodologies. The remaining
models are estimated by implementing instrumental variables IV-FE approach.
Pass-through
The evidence of pass-through on credit dollarization is given in Tables 2 and 3. Both
tables focus on the effects of total foreign denominated funds (DollarizationT ) as
well as deposits in foreign denominated currency (DollarizationD). These two tables
differ with respect to the use of control variables. While Table 2 considers the role of
exchange rate fluctuations, Table 3 introduces the interest rate differential between
loans and deposits on foreign currency. The top panels in both tables present the
pass-through results for total foreign denominated funds and the lower panel gives
the pass-through results for foreign currency deposits. For all panels, we see that the
pass-through is less than unity. In fact, for most of the models pass-through is around
or less than 0.6. This suggests that for each unit of foreign currency deposited in a
bank, at most 60% of it is passed to borrowers in the form of foreign currency loans.
The remainder is either kept as reserves or converted into domestic currency before
providing credit in domestic currency.
When we examine the impact of exchange rate volatility, regardless of the proxy,
we see that exchange rate on its own or in interaction does not affect loans in foreign
currency. This is expected to some extend as banks in Turkey fully hedge exchange
rate risks. When we turn to Table 3, we find that interest rate differential does not
affect pass-through on its own. Furthermore, the interaction terms are not significant,
either.
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It is worth stressing that the pass-through coefficient is substantially less than
unity. In general one could argue despite hedging, a risk exposure of this magnitude
can trigger a series of bankruptcies, jeopardizing the stability of the financial sector.
Although, in an environment where exchange rate is stable, these risks can be negli-
gible, for an emerging economy, any political or economic turmoil affect the value of
the currency and impact the ability of the borrowers to pay back their loans. Failures
as such would disrupt the stability of the banking sector and the state of the economy
affecting the economy severely. One may object to this argument indicating that the
GDP is growing. However, growth is not a consequence of investment or production
but of consumption. In fact, despite the reductions in current account deficit due
to sharp decline in oil prices, the domestic currency has been devaluated against the
major currencies since mid 2015 in the order of 20-30%; signaling for hard times ahead.
Liquidity management
Table 4 demonstrates how financial dollarization affects liquidity management of
banks where liquidity is defined as the ratio of liquid assets (cash balances with
the Central Bank, trading securities, interbank loans, money market securities, in-
vestment securities) to total assets.12 Results consistently show that lending in for-
eign currency (DollarizationL) induces banks to use their resources more effectively:
banks reduce their liquid asset holdings as lending in foreign currency increases. Sup-
ply of funds in foreign currency, deposit dollarization (DollarizationD) or total foreign
liabilities (DollarizationT ), do not appear to impact on liquidity management. The
interaction terms between sources of funds and measures of exchange rate and interest
rate risks are significant in columns 2, 5 and 6, implying that risks do not transmit
through dollarization on the extent of liquidity that banks hold.
Exchange rate volatility is expected to have a positive effect on banks’ liquid
assets. The second and the fourth columns in Table 4 depict a positive coefficient
associated with exchange rate volatility. Although this effect is not forthcoming in all
models, second and the fourth columns provide support for our expectations. This
result suggests that banks hold more liquid assets when the exchange rate volatility
12Regression results for an alternative definition of liquidity are similar to what we present here.
These results are available upon request from the authors.
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increases for exchange rate fluctuations may impose extra stress on bank operations.
Interest rate differentials do not seem to impact liquidity preferences of the banks.
Although not reported, in all models, bank size affects liquidity positively. We also
find that liquidity increases with bank strength. These observations are expected.
Performance
Table 5 focuses on the impact of dollarization on bank performance which we measure
using banks’ return on equity (ROE).13 The first four columns of the table present
the results when exchange rate uncertainty is used as a control variable and the last
two columns show those results when interest rate differentials are used as a control
variable.
The results provide evidence that an increase in foreign denominated loans (DollarizationL)
lead to an improvement in performance. We also observe that the interaction coef-
ficient between foreign denominated loans and the control variable (exchange rate
volatility or interest rate differentials) is negative. This suggests that the positive
effect of loans in foreign currency on bank performance will decline as exchange rate
volatility increases or the interest rate difference between the liabilities and the assets
increase. In other words, bank performance would decline should risk in the economic
environment increase. We find no effect of sources of funds on bank returns.
Exchange rate variability has a positive effect on performance. This effect may be
a result of better management of liquid assets as exchange rate fluctuates. In the case
of interest rate differentials, we find that an increase in lending rate with respect to
that of deposits’ improve returns. Although not reported, we observe that the larger
the bank size the higher is the performance. These findings are intuitive.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we examine dollarization and its consequences for a panel of com-
mercial banks from Turkey. An examination as such on Turkish banks is relevant
because dollarization has become an acute problem in Turkey. In our investigation
13Results are similar when we use the interest margin as a measure of performance. These findings
are available upon request from the authors.
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we demonstrate the presence of pass-through of foreign denominated funds to borrow-
ers in the form of foreign currency denominated loans. We then examine the effects
of dollarization on liquidity management and bank performance. We use quarterly
data and cover the period between 2003q1 and 2014q4 during which inflation and the
exchange rate were relatively stable as the government was keen to attract foreign
funds into the country.
Our investigation shows that there is a partial pass-through of foreign funds into
borrowers in the form of foreign denominated loans. The remaining funds are either
kept as reserves or converted into domestic currency to lend to other borrowers.
We also find that an increase in foreign denominated loans forces banks to reduce
their liquid assets. In this context, an increase in foreign denominated loans leads
to better management of liquidity, and yield higher bank performance. This claim
receives support when we examine bank performance: bank performance improves
with an increase in foreign currency denominated loans. However, captured through
the interaction terms, we also find that the performance of banks that dollarize decline
when risks increase. Our findings hold true controlling for exchange rate volatility
or interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign denominated deposits or
loans, bank strength and bank size.
An examination of the results suggests that an increase in foreign currency de-
nominated loans in Turkey improves bank performance. However, the pass-through
is far less than unity so that the banks have to internalize risks. In such environments
potential costs associated with dollarization should be carefully weighed against the
benefits. In particular, given that the government had done little to solve the struc-
tural problems over the last 10 years, it is not clear for how long the central bank will
be able to maintain the value of the currency. Furthermore, as the privatization pro-
gramme of the government has finalized (as several government officials declared that
there is no other state enterprise left to privatize) it will be harder to attract foreign
funds into the country. Under these circumstances, it appears that an exchange rate
crisis will have much devastating effects than the one experienced in 1994 or 2001.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of dollarization in Turkey: 2003q1–2014q1. The panel shows ratio of USD
denominated loans to total loans (DollarizationL), ratio of USD denominated deposits to total de-
posits (DollarizationD), ratio of USD denominated liabilities (deposits and funds) to total liabilities
(DollarizationT ).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 2003q1–2014q1.
Panel A: Bank-level variables
Mean SD Q1 Q2 Q3 N
ROE 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 1,614
DollarizationL 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.28 0.43 1,500
DollarizationD 0.50 0.24 0.35 0.46 0.64 1,420
DollarizationT 0.58 0.25 0.42 0.55 0.76 1,582
Liquidity 0.45 0.26 0.24 0.36 0.67 1,614
Panel B: Macro-level variables
Mean SD Q1 Q2 Q3 N
CSD 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 1,614
CIQR 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 1,614
C∆LR 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.13 1,614
C∆DR 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.14 1,614
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of the key variables used in the analysis. Panel A
summarizes bank-level variables: return on equity (ROE), ratio of USD denominated loans to total
loans (DollarizationL), ratio of USD denominated deposits to total deposits (DollarizationD),
ratio of USD denominated liabilities (deposits and funds) to total liabilities (DollarizationT ), ratio
of liquid assets (cash balances with the Central Bank, trading securities, interbank loans, money
market securities, investment secutiries) to total assets (Liquidity). Panel B summarizes macro-level
variables: inter-quarter standard deviation of US dollar - Turkish Lira exchange rate (CSD), inter-
quarter interquartile range of US dollar - Turkish lira exchange rate (CIQR), difference between US
dollar denominated loan rates and Turkish lira denominated loan rates (C∆LR), difference between
US dollar denominated deposit rate and Turkish Lira denominated deposit rates (CDR). Q1, Q2,
and Q3 are the first, second and third quartiles, respectively. N is the number of bank-years.
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Table 2: GLM and Panel data IV estimates of pass-through and exchange rate risk: CSD and CIQR.
Panel A: Total Liabilities DollarizationT pass-through
GLM (t-1) IV FE (t) GLM (t-1) IV FE (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DollarizationT 0.531*** 0.495*** 0.529*** 0.593***
(0.136) (0.186) (0.137) (0.177)








Bank-quarters 1,430 1,300 1,430 1,300
IDP 0.00 0.00
Overid 0.34 0.10
Panel B: Deposit DollarizationD pass-through
GLM (t-1) IV FE (t) GLM (t-1) IV FE (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DollarizationD 0.427*** 0.440** 0.426*** 0.521***
(0.144) (0.175) (0.145) (0.156)








Bank-quarters 1,292 1,178 1,292 1,178
IDP 0.00 0.00
Overid 0.39 0.23
Notes: Dependent variable is ratio of USD denominated loans to total loans
(DollarizationL). Log(TA) and Equity/TA are included in specifications, but not reported.
Robust SEs are given in the parentheses. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
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Table 3: GLM and Panel data IV estimates of pass-through and interest rate risk: C∆CR and C∆DR.
Panel A: Total Liabilities DollarizationT pass-through.
GLM (t-1) IV FE (t) GLM (t-1) IV FE (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DollarizationT 0.528*** 0.511*** 0.545*** 0.551***
(0.176) (0.127) (0.168) (0.130)








Bank-quarters 1,430 1,300 1,430 1,261
IDP 0.00 0.00
Overid 0.72 0.71
Panel B: Deposit DollarizationD pass-through
GLM (t-1) IV FE (t) GLM (t-1) IV FE (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DollarizationD 0.380*** 0.259** 0.392*** 0.256**
(0.146) (0.116) (0.138) (0.113)








Bank-quarters 1,292 1,143 1,292 1,143
IDP 0.00 0.00
Overid 0.21 0.14
Notes: Dependent variable is ratio of USD denominated loans to total loans
(DollarizationL). Log(TA) and Equity/TA are included in specifications, but not reported.
Robust SEs are given in the parentheses. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
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Table 4: Panel Data IV estimates of Liquidity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DollarizationL -0.470** -0.384** -0.391*** -0.528** -0.115*** -0.132***
(0.199) (0.191) (0.142) (0.224) (0.036) (0.041)
DollarizationL × CSD 1.567 -6.576*
(3.356) (3.852)
DollarizationL × CIQR 4.169 -1.783
(2.575) (2.275)
DollarizationL × C∆LR -0.428* -0.490*
(0.225) (0.254)
DollarizationT 0.238 0.251 -0.003
(0.163) (0.185) (0.049)
DollarizationT × CSD -5.220
(4.287)
DollarizationT × CIQR -4.633
(3.238)
DollarizationT × C∆DR -0.040
(0.268)
DollarizationD 0.195 0.239 -0.122
(0.163) (0.147) (0.091)
DollarizationD × CSD -2.891
(4.167)
DollarizationD × CIQR -3.014
(2.274)










Bank-years 1,340 1,217 1,380 1,217 1,380 1,254
IDP 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overid 0.13 0.51 0.34 0.13 0.17 0.28
Notes: Dependent variables are ratio of liquid assets (cash balances with the Central Bank,
trading securities, interbank loans, money market securities, investment securities) to to-
tal assets (Liquidity1). Log(TA) and Equity/TA are included in specifications, but not
reported. Robust SEs are given in the parentheses. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.23
Table 5: Panel Data IV estimates of Performance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DollarizationL 0.290* 0.421*** 0.217** 0.383*** 0.203** 0.182**
(0.169) (0.126) (0.104) (0.118) (0.099) (0.083)
DollarizationL × CSD -8.947* -12.567***
(4.752) (3.448)
DollarizationL × CIQR -4.310** -7.915***
(1.894) (2.138)
DollarizationL × C∆LR -1.020** -1.293*
(0.466) (0.681)
DollarizationT 0.196 0.049 -0.057
(0.173) (0.122) (0.054)
DollarizationT × CSD -4.674
(4.394)
DollarizationT × CIQR -1.781
(2.133)
DollarizationT × C∆DR 0.102
(0.312)
DollarizationD -0.141 0.012 -0.534*
(0.126) (0.123) (0.275)
DollarizationD × CSD 5.926
(3.668)
DollarizationD × CIQR 0.956
(2.266)










Bank-years 1,380 1,252 1,380 1,179 1,380 1,254
IDP 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.08
Overid 0.91 0.35 0.34 0.19 0.51 0.21
Notes: Dependent variable is return on equity (ROE). Log(TA) and Equity/TA are in-
cluded in specifications, but not reported. Robust SEs are given in the parentheses. *
p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.01.
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